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£AEXI£S_ 
APPELLANTS: ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, INC., a Utah 
corporation, d/b/a HOPE OF AMERICA* THRIFT STORE; SINE 
INVESTMENT, INC., d/b/a SCOTT"S TRAVEL MOTOR HOTELS; SITE, INC., 
d/b/a RANCHO 42 LANES RECREATION CENTER; JERRY SINE INVESTMENTS, 
a partnership, d/b/a/ SE RANCHO MOTOR MOTEL; and STOCKHOLM 
RESTAURANT, INC. 
RESPONDENTS; SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, a Municipal Corporation 
Of the State of Utah; SALT LAKE CITY MAYOR, TED WILSON; AL 
HAYNES, Assistant to Salt Lake City Mayor; CITY ENGINEER, MAX 
PETERSON; RICK JOHNSTON, Assistant City Engineer; STATE OF UTAH; 
SCOTT MATHESON, as Governor of the State of Utah; STATE COUNCIL 
OF DEFENSE; STATE ROAD COMMISSION; and SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the State of Utah. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN THRIFT STORES, 
INC., et al., 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
et al., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 20513 
BRIEF OF STATE RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Was the lower cour t c o r r e c t in g r an t i ng summary 
judgment, in l i g h t of Governmental Immunity and o ther defenses 
T 
asserted by the State Respondents? \ 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The year 1983 was one of extraordinary, unanticipated 
and unprecedented rainfall. Governor Matheson declared a State 
of Emergency on May 29, 1983. The State of Utah and its 
political subdivisions, using emergency police powers, then 
combined their efforts to combat the resulting runoff and to 
prevent flood damage. 
'¥ 
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The Sta te was only minimally involved in flood control 
within Sa l t Lake City since flood control in tha t area i s under 
the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Salt Lake County. The Sta te a s s i s t ed the 
City and County effor t by allowing their: the use of North Temple 
Street , also designated as s t a t e highway SR-186, to help control 
runoff. Agents for the County agreed to r e s to re the s t r e e t to 
i t s o r ig ina l condit ion af te r the emergency was over (Deposition 
of Richard T. Holtzworth, page 35, R. 581; deposit ion of Max 
Peterson, page 36, R. 582). 
A two-block area between 6th and 8th West on North 
Temple S t ree t was blocked off for a two-week period while crews 
attempted to r e s to re drainage to the clogged North Temple S t ree t 
culver t system. Access to these p rope r t i e s , however, was s t i l l 
poss ib le during the two-week period through several backs t ree ts 
and some businesses were s t i l l access ib le from North Temple 
S t r ee t (Deposition of Albert E. Haines, I I I , page 33, R. 584; 
Deposition of Max Peterson, page 63, R. 5fe*2) . Flood waters were 
a lso channeled down North Temple S t r ee t . After t h i s time period, 
access to the area was impaired, but not completely r e s t r i c t e d . 
North Temple S t ree t was chosen to carry the flood 
runoff because i t was the most logica l route . The culvert system 
running beneath North Temple S t ree t did not have the capacity to 
handle such extraordinary amounts of water. After analyzing 
every possible a l t e r n a t i v e , c i ty engineers determined tha t 
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running a temporary " r i v e r " down North Temple S t r e e t was the bes t 
method of c o n t r o l l i n g the f lood in t h a t the fewest number of 
people and b u s i n e s s e s would be harmed by the d e c i s i o n (Deposit ion 
of Albert E. Haines , I I I , page 26, R. 584; Depos i t ion of Max 
Peterson, page 3 6 , 68 , 73 -74 , R. 5 8 2 ) . 
If the d e c i s i o n to channel f loodwaters down North 
Temple S t r e e t had not been made, the r e s u l t would have been 
e x t e n s i v e downtown f looding (Deposi t ion of Bla ine Kay, page 34, 
R. 5 8 5 ) . Since t he c u l v e r t system was inadequate for such l a r g e 
amounts of water under the b e s t of c o n d i t i o n s (and c o n d i t i o n s 
were t e r r i b l e because of the thousands of tons of s i l t , d i r t , and 
d e b r i s washed down from the mounta ins ) , manhole covers along 
North Temple S t r e e t would have been forced open. Floodwaters 
would have escaped unimpeded. Bus inesses along North Temple 
S t r e e t would have su f fe red t h e brunt of the damage. Eecause of 
the f lood c o n t r o l e f f o r t , however, damage was reduced to mere 
T 
inconvenience of access t o t he p r o p e r t y . * 
The City and County began r e p a i r of the c u l v e r t systen-
on June 16 , 1983. A c o n t r a c t with Four-Way Excavat ing , I n c . , was 
e n t e r e d i n t o on September 19 , 1983. The c o n t r a c t r equ i r ed the 
c o n t r a c t o r t o complete a l l work w i t h i n 60 days (Aff idav i t of Rick 
Johnson and Max Pe t e r son , page 5, R. 68 ; Exh ib i t C of t h a t 
A f f i d a v i t , R. 8 0 - 8 1 ) . The s t r e e t was completely r e s t o r e d t o i t s 
o r i g i n a l c o n d i t i o n on November 14 , 1983 (Deposi t ion of Blaine 
Kay, page 29 , R. 5 8 5 ) . 
1. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower c o u r t ' s grant of summary judgment was co r rec t 
because there i s no factual issue concerning a number of 
affirmative defenses asser ted by the S t a t e . As a matter of law, 
the State i s immune from s u i t for the act ions complained of under 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-1, et seq. 
(1953), as amended. The S t a t e ' s ac t ions were governmental 
functions such tha t only governmental agencies could properly 
perform them, and immunity for such act ions has not been waived. 
Appel lants ' act ion i s l ikewise barred by the Disaster 
Response and Recovery Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a- l , et seq. 
(1953) , as amended. Tftis Act allows the governor broad 
d iscre t ionary powers, including the power to control ingress and 
egress to and from a d i sas te r area. 
Even if such s ta tu tory exemptions were not ava i l ab le , 
the Sta te was in no way negligent in i t s ac t ions . Allowing the 
City and County to use North Temple S t ree t in t he i r e f for t s to 
control flooding was both reasonable and necessary. Furthermore, 
given the then-exis t ing condi t ions , the time frame for the repair 
of the road was reasonable. 
The r e s t r i c t i o n of access to appel lants 1 property does 
not qualify as a "taking" under the theory of eminent domain. 
Rather, i t was a va l id exercise of the S t a t e ' s police power, for 
which compensation to the landowners does not apply. 
/ 
'7 
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Finally, because these defenses apply to the State, ana 
there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning them, the 
lower court was correct in granting summary judgment. Therefore, 
that decision should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE ARE IMMUNE FROM 
SUIT BY THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
A. THE ACTIONS OF THE STATE WERE 
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1953) , as amended, provides 
in part: 
Except as may be otherwise provided 
in t h i s a c t , a l l governmental e n t i t i e s 
are immune from su i t for any injury tha t 
r e s u l t s from the exercise of 
governmental functions. . . . 
Recent case law has narrowed the t e s t for determining whether a 
function i s governmental. Even under t h i s more r e s t r i c t i v e t e s t , 
however, there can be no doubt that the alleged act ions of the 
Sta te in t h i s case are governmental in nature . 
In the case of Standiford v. Sal t Lake City, 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980) and Johnson v. Salt Lake City, 629 P.2d 432 
(Utah 1981), t h i s Court abandoned the governmental versus 
propr ie ta ry t e s t , and held tha t the t e s t for determining 
governmental functions i s whether the a c t i v i t y under 
considerat ion i s of such a unique nature that i t can only be 
performed by a governmental agency or that i t i s e s sen t i a l to the 
- 5 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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core of governmental a c t i v i t y . See also Madsen v. Borthick, 658 
P.2d 627 (Utah 1983)• 
A brief examination of the ro le of the use of police 
power in a s t a t e of emergency leaves no doubt the S t a t e ' s act ions 
were of such a unique nature tha t they could only be perforrried by 
a governmental agencyf and are therefore governmental in nature. 
The S t a t e ' s emergency police power i s defined in the State of 
Utah Disaster Response and Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a 
(1983). The purpose of the act i s to "ass i s t the governor of 
t h i s s t a t e and i t s p o l i t i c a l subdivisions to effect ively provide 
emergency d i sas te r response and recovery ass is tance in order to 
p ro tec t the l i v e s and property of the people." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-5a- l (2 ) (1983) . 
Response to an emergency s i tua t ion could not be 
adequately accomplished by a pr ivate e n t i t y . A pr ivate en t i t y 
simply could not marshall a l l the resources necessary in the 
7. 
short time avai lable to combat a countywiqe d i s a s t e r , and a 
statewide d i sas te r would ce r t a in ly be beyond i t s competence. 
When the State permitted the City and County to use 
North Temple S t ree t to a l l e v i a t e flood damage to the grea tes t 
possible extent under the then-exis t ing circumstances, i t was 
performing the governmental function of protect ing i t s c i t i zens 
in an emergency. In f ac t , the immediate th rea t s posed to l i f e 
and property by uncontrolled flooding make such operations 
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uniquely governmental, almost equivalent to police and f i r e 
protection. The State made a decision tha t only the government 
can make. It was a d i scre t ionary act tha t wasf in the words of 
the court in Borthick, "qua l i t a t ive ly d i f fe ren t" from any 
decision a private en t i t y could make. 658 P.2d a t 631. 
Further evidence of the governmental nature of the 
S t a t e ' s ac t ions i s provided by the Utah L e g i s l a t u r e ' s enactment 
in the 1984 Budget Session of S. B. No. 97, which was described 
as "an act r e l a t i n g to f looding; c la r i fy ing flooding as a 
governmental function for purposes of governmental immunity 
. . . . " The act provided as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided 
in t h i s chapter , a l l governmental 
e n t i t i e s are immune from s u i t for any 
injury which r e s u l t s from the exercise 
of a governmental function. . . The 
management of flood waters and the 
cons t ruc t ion , r epa i r , and operation of 
flood and storm systems by governmental 
e n t i t i e s are considered to be 
governmental functions, and governmental 
e n t i t i e s and the i r off icers and 
employees are immune from su i t for any 
injury or damage resu l t ing from those 
a c t i v i t i e s . 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1984) . This amendment leaves no doubt 
tha t the State Respondents are immune from l i a b i l i t y in the 
ins tan t case. 
Although t h i s amendment was passed in January, 1984, I 
has r e t r o a c t i v e effect and i s therefore appl icable to t h i s 
lawsui t . Because the b i l l ' s s ta ted purpose was to c la r i fy the 
y 
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def in i t ion of a governmental function, there i s no problem with 
an ex post fac to appl ica t ion of the law. The Utah Supreme Court 
held in Okland Construction Co. v. Indus t r ia l Commission, 520 
P.2d 208 (Utah 1974) tha t the pr inc ip le that one i s e n t i t l e d to 
have h i s r i g h t s determined on the basis of law as i t existed at 
the time of the occurrence and tha t a l a t e r s t a tu t e or amendment 
should not be applied in a r e t roac t ive manner to deprive a party 
of h i s r igh t s or to impose greater l i a b i l i t y upon him has no 
appl ica t ion where the l a t e r s t a t u t e or amendment deals only with 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n or amplif icat ion as to how the law should have been 
understood pr ior to i t s enactment. This p r inc ip le which allows 
the r e t roac t ive appl ica t ion of the 1984 amendment in the present 
case was recent ly reinforced in Sta te Department of Social 
Services v. Higgs, 656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982). See also Garret t 
Freight Lines v. State Tax Commission. 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523 
(1943) and Macham v. Sta te Tax Commission, 17 Utah 2d 321,410 
P.2d 1008 (1966). H 
B. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY HAS NOT BEEN 
WAIVED IN RELATION TO THE STATE1S 
ACTIONS. 
Since the alleged actions of the State Respondents were 
governmental functionsf they are immune from suit unless immunity 
has been waived. The Immunity Act states: "Immunity from suit 
of all governmental entities is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
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within the scope of his employment. . . . n Utah Code Ann. § 
63-30-10(1) (1983). Notwithstanding t h i s waiver, the act 
continues by l i s t i n g spec i f i c exceptions to the waiver. Three of 
these exceptions are appl icable to the alleged act ions of the 
State Respondents. 
1 . Discret ionary Functions. 
All of the alleged act ions of the Sta te are immune from 
s u i t under the d iscre t ionary function exception of the Immunity 
Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1) (a) (Supp. 1983). The Court in 
Frank v. S t a t e , 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980) s ta ted that t h i s 
exception to the s t a tu to ry waiver of immunity was not as broad as 
the common def in i t ion of "d i sc re t ion , " but rather "was intended 
to shield those governmental ac ts and decisions impacting on 
la rge numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable ways from 
individual and c l a s s legal ac t ions , the continual th rea t of whicn 
would make public adminis t ra t ion a l l but impossible." 
The decision to allow the City/and County to use North 
Temple S t ree t in the i r attempt to minimize flood damage involved 
policy-making functions of the government; not merely operational 
funct ions. The decision of whether to allow such use had the 
po ten t ia l of affect ing many people; those located along North 
Temple S t ree t as well as those who would have been damaged if 
such preventat ive measures had not been taken. 
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The actions of the State Respondents can also qualify 
( 
as d i sc re t ionary functions under the t e s t adopted in L i t t l e v, 
Utah State Division of Family Services , 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983). 
Under that t e s t , four preliminary questions must be answered 
aff i rmatively in order for the act ions to be considered 
d i sc re t iona ry : 
(1) Does the challenged ac t , omission, 
or decision necessar i ly involve a basic 
governmental pol icy, program, or 
object ive? 
(2) Is the questioned ac t , omission, or 
decision e s sen t i a l to the r e a l i z a t i o n or j 
accomplishment of that pol icy, program, 
or object ive as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or d i rec t ion 
: of the policy, program, or object ive? 
(3) Does the ac t , omission or decision 
require the exercise of basic policy 
evaluat ion, judgment, and exper t i se on 
the par t of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency 
involved possess the r equ i s i t e 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l , s t a tu to ry , *or lawful 
au thor i ty and duty to do or make the 
challenged ac t , omission, or decision? 
Lifcilg, 667 P.2d a t 51. 
The Sta te Respondents' act or decision complained of in 
t h i s case involves allowing the City and County to use North 
Temple S t ree t in order to minimize damage from flooding. This 
decision was part of a basic governmental ob jec t ive . The 
Disaster Response and Recovery Act empowered the governor to 
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declare a state emergency. Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a-5 (Supp. 
1983). The stated purpose or object ive of the act i s : "lT]o 
ass i s t the governor of t h i s s t a t e and i t s p o l i t i c a l subdivisions 
to e f fect ive ly provide emergency d i sas te r response and recovery 
assistance in order to protect the l i v e s and property of the 
people.* Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a-12 (Supp. 1983) (emphasis 
added). The decision to allow the use of North Temple St ree t was 
designed to achieve the basic governmental objective of 
pro tec t ing the l i v e s and property of the people. Therefore, the 
f i r s t question of the L i t t l e t e s t must be answered aff i rmat ively . 
The decision to allow the City and County to use the 
s t r e e t not only involved a basic governmental object ive, but was 
e s sen t i a l to i t . Had that decision not been made, extensive 
downtown flooding would have resul ted (Deposition of Blaine Kay, 
page 34, R. 585). Consequently, the damage caused by flooding tc 
property and possibly even l i v e s woulo have been much grea te r . 
Because the challenged decision was e s sen t i a l to the objective cf 
preventing t h i s damage, the second question i s also answered 
af f i rmat ively . 
The challenged decision also required the exercise of 
policy evaluat ion, judgment, and exper t i se of the Sta te 
Respondents. Only the governor i s in a posi t ion to obtain the 
cr i t i ca l information, evaluate i t , and make the proper judgments 
concerning such a wide-scale emergency. The challenged decision 
/ 
• / 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l ikewise required the judgment and exper t i se of s t a t e agencies 
concerning the condition and capacity of s t a t e highways. The 
decision involved the weighing of many important fac tors which, 
especial ly in the context of a s t a t e of emergency, could only 
have been accomplished by the Sta te Respondents. Hence, the 
th i rd quest ion in the L i t t l e t e s t must be answered aff i rmatively. 
As mentioned above, the State Respondents possessed the 
r e q u i s i t e au thor i ty and duty to make the challenged decision 
under the Disaster Response and Recovery Act. Utah Code Ann. § 
63-5a, et seq. (Supp. 1983). Furthermore, the State Road 
Commission has the authori ty and duty to administer the s t a t e 
highways. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-7 (1984). Thus, the fourth and 
f ina l question of the L i t t l e t e s t must be answered in the 
af f i rmat ive . 
Therefore, the act ions of the State Respondents in the 
i n s t an t case were, in a l l aspec ts , d i sc re t ionary . For that 
reason, governmental immunity has not beeft waived. Allowing 
Appellants1 ac t ion against the Sta te would cause the very type of 
hindrance to public adminis t rat ion tha t the Immunity Act was 
designed to prevent. Frank, 613 P.2d a t 520. 
2. Issuance of a permit or approval. 
Under subsection 63-30-10(1)(c) of the Governmental 
Immunity Act, the immunity of the Sta te i s not waived if the 
alleged negligent act or omission a r i s e s out of the issuance or 
•y 
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denial of a permit, l i cense , approval or s imilar au thor iza t icn . 
The State i s immune from s u i t under t h i s s ta tu to ry provision on 
two t h e o r i e s : (a) the al leged injury arose out of the approval 
to use North Temple S t r e e t ; and (b) the alleged injury caused by 
the excavation of the s t r e e t arose out of the issuance of a 
permit. 
Issuing approval to use North Temple S t ree t was a 
d i sc re t ionary function authorized by the Disaster Response and 
Recovery Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a-l (1983). Section 
63-5a-3(a) empowers the governor to u t i l i z e a l l avai lable 
resources of s t a t e government as reasonably necessary to cope 
with a s t a t e of emergency. That the approval allowing the City 
and County's use of the s t r e e t was both reasonable and necessary 
i s obvious from the fac t that City and County engineers 
considered every possible a l t e r n a t i v e before determining tha t 
that pa r t i cu l a r act ion was the best way to control the flooding 
V (Deposition of Albert E. Haines, I I I , pacfe 26, R. 584; Deposition 
of Max Peterson, pages 36, 68, 73-74, R. 582). 
S imi lar ly , the Sta te i s immune from su i t based on the 
issuance of a permit. Most of the damage the Appellants al lege 
to have suffered was the r e s u l t of the County's repai r of the 
culver t system running beneath North Temple S t r ee t . Whenever 
repairs of t h i s type are contemplated, the local governmental 
ent i ty must apply for a permit before excavation may begin. Utah 
Code Ann. § 27-12-133 (1953). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The County did not obtain the necessary permit unt i l 
after excavation had begun because of the immediacy of the 
s i tuat ion. As soon as p r a c t i c a l , however, the County applied for 
and received the permit to excavate from the Utah Department of 
Transportation. This i s the exact type of permit covered by Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) (c) for which governmental immunity i s not 
waived. Thus, any claim for damages based on negligence ar i s ing 
out of the issuance of the approval or the permit i s barred by 
s t a t u t e . 
3. Natural condition. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(k), the immunity of the 
S ta te i s not waived if the alleged negligent act or omission 
a r i s e s from any natural conditions on s t a t e lands . Although 
there i s no case law on t h i s provision, a reasonable construct ion 
would allow the fac t s of the ins tan t case to be included within 
the scope of t h i s sec t ion . 
Flooding i s a natural condition* Although the 
diversion of the flood onto North Temple Street changed i t s 
charac ter , i t nevertheless remained a natural phenomenon. The 
act ions by the S ta t e , City and County were merely attempts to 
control a natural and dangerous condit ion. Such construct ive 
in te rvent ion should not be construed to take the fac t s of the 
case outside of the parameters of the s t a t u t e . Therefore, the 
State i s immune from any claim for damages a r i s ing out of i t s 
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actions due to the natural condition of flood waters being 
present on North Temple Street. 
II. APPELLANTS1 ACTION IS BARRED BY SECTION 
63-5a-8 OF THE DISASTER RESPONSE AND 
RECOVERY ACT. 
In addi t ion to the bar of Sovereign Immunity, 
Appel lants ' claims agains t the State are barred by the Disaster 
Response and Recovery Act. Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a-8 (1983). The 
act grants the governor general emergency powers to declare a 
" s t a t e of emergency" in any par t of the s t a t e in order to meet an 
emergency created by man-made or natural d i s a s t e r . 
On May 29, 1983, Governor Matheson issued an executive 
order declaring a s t a t e of emergency in Sal t Lake County due to 
flooding and l ands l i de s . The dec lara t ion , under the Disaster 
Response and Recovery Act, gave the governor the power t o : 
(a) Ut i l i ze a l l avai lable 
resources of the s t a t e government as 
reasonably necessary to cope with a 
"s ta te of emergency"; ^ 
(b) Employ measures and give 
d i rec t ion to s t a t e and local offices and 
agencies which are reasonable and 
necessary for the purpose of securing 
compliance with the provisions of t h i s 
ac t and with orders , r u l e s , provis ions , 
and regula t ions made pursuant to t h i s 
a c t ; 
(f) Control ingress and egress to 
and from a d i sas t e r area, the movement 
of persons within the area, and 
/ 
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recommend the occupancy or evacuation of 
premises in a disaster area. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-5a-3(a) to (b) , (f) (1983). 
The State therefore had the power to allow the County 
to use the state highway in its flood control measures. It 
further had the power to control ingress to and egress from the 
area, including Appellants1 property. The State could totally 
restrict access to the disaster area, which it did not do. The 
limited nature of the restriction precludes the idea that the 
restriction was a "taking" under the theory of eminent domain. 
The action was rather a temporary emergency regulation which was 
both reasonable and necessary. 
Section 63-5a-8 of the act allows the governor to 
acquire private property for public use in order to meet the 
disaster situation. Subsection 3 provides that the owners of the 
property so acquired shall be compensated in accordance with 
applicable eminent domain procedures. Th^ theory of eminent 
domain, however, is inapplicable when emergency police powers are 
validly exercised. 
III. THE STATE DID NOT ACT NEGLIGENTLY IN THE 
ALLEGED FAILURE TO TIMELY RESTORE TOTAL 
ACCESS TO APPELLANTS1 PROPERTY. 
Highway officers and other public authorities are 
required by statute to keep highways in good repair free from 
obstructions, and to not unduly interfere with the ingress and 
egress to abutting properties. Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-134 and § 
73-1-8 (1953), as amended. 
•y : 
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The governor, under the authori ty vested in him by the 
Disaster Relief and Recovery Act, authorized the City and County 
to use the North Temple S t ree t in i t s flood control measures. 
The County agreed to timely repair damage to the s t r e e t 
(Deposition of Richard T. Holtzworth, page 35f R. 581; Deposition 
of Max Peterson, page 36, R. 582). 
Agreements made by the governor under the Act have the 
force of law. The Act provides t ha t : 
All orders , ru les , and regu la t ions , 
promulgated by the governor, or by a 
p o l i t i c a l subdivision or other agency 
authorized by t h i s act to make orders , 
ru les and regula t ions , not in conf l ic t 
with ex i s t ing laws except as 
spec i f i ca l ly provided herein , shal l have 
the fu l l force and effect of law during 
the s t a t e of emergency. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-5a-7 (1953), as amended. This provision, 
coupled with Section 63-5a-3(a) gave the governor the power to 
use the highway in any manner he f e l t was "reasonably necessary." 
T When the emergency ended, i t was the County's, rather than the 
S t a t e ' s , duty to repair the highway. 
In Andrus v. S t a t e , 541 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1975), Salt 
Lake County permitted the Sta te to empty the highway drainage 
system into i t s sewer. A homeowner whose property was damaged 
sued the State on the theory that i t negl igent ly constructed the 
highway pro jec t , and sued the County on the theory that i t had 
negl igent ly fa i l ed to provide adequate drainage f a c i l i t i e s to the 
/ 
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highway p r o j e c t . The c o u r t h e l d t h a t t h e County , by g i v i n g i t s 
p e r m i s s i o n t o t h e S t a t e t o empty t h e highway d r a i n a g e sys tem i n t o 
t h e C o u n t y ' s s e w e r , would n o t be l i a b l e fo r t h e a c t s of t h e S t a t e 
i n f a i l i n g t o p r o v i d e s a f e g u a r d s t o p r e v e n t t h e o b s t r u c t i o n of 
t h e sewer s y s t e m , nor was t h e County r e s p o n s i b l e fo r t h e a c t i o n 
of t h e S t a t e i n empty ing a l a r g e c o n d u i t i n t o t h e C o u n t y ' s smal l 
c o n d u i t . 
The same r e s u l t s h o u l d be r e a c h e d i n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e . 
The S t a t e , i n a s s i s t i n g t h e County , d i d no t become l i a b l e f o r any 
a l l e g e d n e g l i g e n c e on t h e p a r t of t h e County . The S t a t e had no 
s t a t u t o r y du ty t o a s s i s t t h e County i n t h i s a r e a , and t h u s c o u l d 
n o t have b r e a c h e d i t s d u t y , t h e r e b y becoming l i a b l e t o 
A p p e l l a n t s . 
Even i f t h e S t a t e had t h e du ty t o r e p a i r t h e highway 
a f t e r t h e County damaged i t i n i t s f l o o d c o n t r o l m e a s u r e s , i t d id 
n o t b r e a c h t h a t d u t y . The re was no u n r e a s o n a b l e a e l a y in t h e 
r e p a i r of t h e r o a d . S a l t Lake County c o n t r a c t e d w i t h Four-Way 
E x c a v a t i n g t o r e p a i r t h e damage. The c o n t r a c t c a l l e d fo r work t o 
b e g i n on Sep tember 1 9 , 1 9 8 3 . Work was t o be comple t ed w i t h i n 60 
d a y s . C o n s i d e r i n g t h e e x t e n s i v e r e p a i r s t h a t had t o be made t o 
t h e d r a i n a g e sys t em under Nor th Temple S t r e e t when t h e f l o o d i n g 
f i n a l l y s u b s i d e d , t h e t i m e f rame was n o t a t a l l u n r e a s o n a b l e . 
IV. APPELLANTS' ALLEGED INJURY DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A COMPENSABLE TAKING UNDER 
THE DOCTRINE OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION AND 
IS BARRED BY THE CONCEPT OF THE 
EMERGENCY EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. 
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A p p e l l a n t s i n c o r r e c t l y a l l e g e t h a t the S t a t e ' s dec i s ion 
t o al low the use of North Temple S t r e e t t o a l l e v i a t e f looding 
"took" A p p e l l a n t s ' p r o p e r t y , wi thout due p r o c e s s , and t h a t 
compensation i s now owing. As a mat te r of law, t h a t c laim i s 
u n t e n a b l e . F i r s t , a c la im of t ak ing cannot be based on mere 
p rope r ty damage of a temporary n a t u r e . Second, the S t a t e ' s 
a c t i o n s were a v a l i d e x e r c i s e of p o l i c e power, which does not 
r i s e t o the l e v e l of a t ak ing in the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s ense , and 
does not c a l l for compensation. 
A. THERE WAS NO PERMANENT INVASION OR 
APPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY. 
The event Appe l l an t s a s s e r t a s having " taken" t h e i r 
p rope r ty was t h e S t a t e ' s d e c i s i o n t o al low the use of North 
Temple S t r e e t for f lood c o n t r o l measures . However, a s a mat te r 
of law, t h a t was not a t a k i n g . Inverse condemnation occurs and 
compensation i s a p p r o p r i a t e only where t h e r e i s a permanent 
i nvas ion or a p p r o p r i a t i o n of p r o p e r t y . S a n g u i n e t t i v . United 
S t a t e s , 265 U.S. 146 (1924) . 
In S a n g u i n e t t i , the United S t a t e s was sued for inverse 
condemnation when l a n d s were flooded by an overflowing federa l 
i r r i g a t i o n c a n a l . The Court he ld t h a t the f lood ing was only 
temporary and did not amount t o a permanent t a k i n g . " I I ] n order 
t o c r e a t e an e n f o r c e a b l e l i a b i l i t y a g a i n s t t h e government, i t i s 
a t l e a s t necessa ry t h a t the overflow be the d i r e c t r e s u l t of the 
s t r u c t u r e , and c o n s t i t u t e an a c t u a l , permanent invas ion of the 
/ 
- 1 9 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
t o t h e p r o p e r t y . " 245 U.S. a t 149 (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
The d e c i s i o n of t h e United S t a t e s Court of Claims in 
ACCardi v . Upitefl S U U S , 599 F.2d 423 (Ct. CI. 1979) , i s 
p e r t i n e n t and p e r s u a s i v e . There the p l a i n t i f f s sought 
compensation on t h e a s s e r t i o n t h e i r r i v e r s i d e p r o p e r t i e s had been 
" taken" in a f lood t h a t r e s u l t e d from the d e f e n d a n t ' s o p e r a t i o n 
of a dam. The cour t d i smissed t h e claim for reasons t h a t a r e 
equa l ly compel l ing in the i n s t a n t c a s e . "Where a claim of tak ing 
of p r i v a t e p rope r ty for a p u b l i c use i s founded upon i n t e r f e r e n c e 
wi th l and due t o f l ood ing , the burden of proving the claim 
c o n s i s t s of more than a mere showing t h a t governmental a c t i o n has 
' i n t e r f e r e d wi th p rope r ty r i g h t s . 1 " ijfl. a t 429. The p r e s e n t 
Appe l l an t s c e r t a i n l y have a l l e g e d no more than t h a t . Temporary 
i n t e r f e r e n c e wi th the r i g h t of i n g r e s s and e g r e s s t o o n e ' s 
p rope r ty does not c o n s t i t u t e a t a k i n g , and i s not compensable 
T 
r 
under the w e l l - e s t a b l i s h e d concepts of eminent domain. 
B. THE STATE'S ACTION WAS A PROPER EXERCISE 
OF POLICE POWER. 
Po l i ce power e x i s t s even in the absence of any 
s t a t u t o r y a u t h o r i t y , a s a necessary a t t r i b u t e of s t a t e h o o d . 
The re fo re , even i f the machinery of the D i sa s t e r Response and 
Recovery Act were not in p l a c e , compensation would be barred by 
the emergency e x e r c i s e of p o l i c e power. 
¥ 
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I t i s c lear tha t the act ion of blocking access to 
Appel lan t ' s property for two weeks ana then regula t ing ingress 
and egress to i t was an exercise of the police power rather than 
a " taking" of property under eminent domain. The d i s t i nc t ion wa = 
explained by Nichols in h i s t r e a t i s e on eminent domain as 
fol lows: 
The d is t inguishing c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
between eminent domain and the police 
power i s t h a t the former involves a 
taking of property because of i t s need 
for the puDlic use while the l a t t e r 
involves regula t ion of such property to 
prevent the use thereof in a manner tnat 
i s detr imental to the public i n t e r e s t , 
1 Nichols, Nichols on Eminent Domain, 1-127 (1981). The S t a t e ' s 
ac t ion in the ins t an t case was a mere temporary regulat ion of 
property, making i t an exercise of police power. 
Nichols s t a t e s further that under a proper exercise of 
police power, no compensation i s required and there i s nc 
t ransfer of property ownership. 1 Nichols, a t 1-135 to 1-136. 
Under t h i s ana lys i s , there can be no question tha t Appellants1 
act ion cannot be maintained. 
In the pas t , t h i s Court has denied the r igh t of 
recovery for damages r e su l t ing from measures taken in the 
exercise of the police power—as long as no actual permanent, 
physical taking of the property or negligence was involved. In 
McKell v. Spanish Fork Ci ty . 6 Utah 2d 92, 305 P.2d 1097 (1957), 
the court said tha t the e f for t s by the City of Spanish Fork in 
.i 
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responding to extraordinary flood condit ions did not r e s u l t in 
the City being l i a b l e for damages resu l t ing from the flood 
control measures taken. The Court s t a t e s : 
' I t i s indeed r eg re t t ab le that such 
damages r e s u l t to the p l a i n t i f f ' s 
property. But the flood i t s e l f was a 
great misfortune to everyone concerned. 
I t must be expected in an organized 
society tha t co l l ec t ive e f fo r t s to cope - * 
with a d v e r s i t i e s may r e s u l t in ser ious 
damages or sac r i f i ce to the property of 
somef or tha t other onerous burdens must 
be bornef even to the extent of 
s ac r i f i c ing the l i v e s of some 
indiv iduals for the common welfare 
• • • • 
McKell, 6 Utah 2d a t 97, 305 P.2d a t 1100. 
The idea that no compensation i s required under the 
emergency exercise of the police power i s f a i r l y common. See 
House v. Los Angeles County Flood Control D i s t . . 25 Cal.2d 3 84, 
153 P.2d 950 (1944); Stahl v. F inke l s te in . 189 Misc. 870, 73 
N.Y.S.2d 679 (Muni Ct. 1947); and Cougar Business Owners Ass'n v. 
S t a t e . 647 P.2d 481 (Wash. 1982). Where tfce exercise of the ^ 
police power i s properly appl icable , the cons t i tu t iona l provision 
tha t property shal l not be taken without due process of law i s 
inapp l icab le . State of Idaho v. Kellogg, 100 Idaho 483, 600 F.2d 
787 (1979). Moreover, l e g i s l a t i o n enacted in the exercise of 
pol ice power in an emergency is not unconst i tut ional merely 
because i t necessar i ly works a hardship on some indiv iduals for a 
period of l imited durat ion. S tah l , 73 N.Y.S.2d a t 679. 
;. 
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McKell i s important for another reason as wel l . In 
tha t case the c i ty used i t s police power to pro tec t i t s res idents 
from the e f fec ts of an extraordinary flood. Using the "common 
enemy" theory, the court held tha t the necessi ty of the s i tua t ion 
ruled out any l i a b i l i t y on the c i ty f so tha t there was no need to 
even reach the question of whether the doctr ine of sovereign 
immunity applied. 
Any State l i a b i l i t y resu l t ing from an act taken during 
the exercise of emergency police powers i s foreclosed as long as 
the act ion i s reasonable and necessary. The S t a t e ' s act ions in 
th i s case were both reasonable and necessary. The mere act of 
allowing the use of one of i t s highways in an emergency, in order 
to prevent even greater damage i s a val id use of emergency police 
power, and should be exempt from l i a b i l i t y . 
Another Utah case making the point that there wi l l be 
no compensation in the emergency exercise of the police power i s 
i 
Bountiful City V, PeLuC9, 77 Utah 107, lh P. 194 (1930). The 
court in DeLuca s ta ted t ha t : 
If the owner through a lawful 
exercise of the [police] power suffers 
inconvenience, injury or a l o s s , i t i s 
regarded as samnum absque i n j u r i a , 
provided as always tha t cons t i tu t iona l 
mandates have not been invaded by 
conf iscat ion, des t ruc t ion , or 
deprivat ion of property unless i t i s per 
se injur ious or obnoxious to the public j 
heal th or public safety or morals or 
general welfare, or unless under 
condit ions s imilar to tear ing down a 
/ 
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b u i l d i n g t o p r e v e n t t h e s p r e a d of a 
c o n f l a g r a t i o n . (Emphasis a d d e d . ) 
77 Utah a t 1 2 0 - 2 1 , 292 P. a t 200 . S i m i l a r t o t e a r i n g down a 
b u i l d i n g t o p r e v e n t t h e s p r e a d of t h e c o n f l a g r a t i o n i s t h e 
c u t t i n g of a s t r e e t i n o r d e r t o p r e v e n t more s e r i o u s f l o o d i n g . 
T h e r e f o r e , t h i s i s t h e t y p e of c a s e f o r which c o m p e n s a t i o n shou ld 
be b a r r e d . 
Utah c a s e law a l s o makes i t c l e a r t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s 
a c t i o n s i n t h i s c a s e and t h e r e s u l t i n g r e s t r i c t i o n of A p p e l l a n t s 1 
p r o p e r t y d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e s a • ' t a k i n g . " In B a i l e y S e r v i c e and 
Supply Corp . v . S t a t e Road Commiss ion. 533 P .2d 882 (Utah 1 9 7 5 ) , 
t h i s Cour t h e l d t h a t t h e S t a t e ' s e r e c t i o n of a v i a d u c t on t h e 
s t r e e t on which t h e l a n d o w n e r ' s p r o p e r t y f r o n t e d , r e s u l t i n g i n 
i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e l a n d o w n e r ' s r i g h t of e g r e s s and i n g r e s s t o 
i t s p r o p e r t y , was n o t a " t a k i n g " of a p r o p e r t y r i g h t fo r which 
t h e S t a t e was l i a b l e . See a l s o S p r i n g v i l l e Banking Co. v . 
B u r t o n , 10 Utah 1 0 0 , 349 P.2d 157 ( 1 9 6 0 ) : i H o l t v . Utah S t a t e Road 
Commiss ion , 30 Utah 2d 4 , 511 P.2d 1286 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . 
V. BECAUSE NO GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL 
FACT REMAINS, SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS 
PROPERLY GRANTED. 
D e s p i t e c o n t e n t i o n s t h a t g e n u i n e i s s u e s of m a t e r i a l 
f a c t r e m a i n t o be r e s o l v e d , t h e c o u r t below p r o p e r l y g r a n t e d 
summary judgment i n t h e S t a t e ' s f a v o r . As s t a t e d by t h e c o u r t i n 
Horgan v . I n d u s t r i a l Des ign C o r p . , 657 P.2d 7 5 1 , 753 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) , 
" t h e mere e x i s t e n c e of g e n u i n e i s s u e s of f a c t i n t h e c a s e a s a 
•V 
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whole does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if those 
i ssues are immaterial to reso lu t ion of the case . " The defendants 
in Horgan had asser ted as an aff irmative defense a mutual release 
signed by the p l a i n t i f f . Therefore the court held tha t the only 
genuine i s sues t h a t were material to the case were those 
concerning the signing or terms of the r e l ea se . Horoan, 657 P.2d 
a t 752. The general rule i s , "where an aff irmative defense i s 
s t a ted . . . which would defeat the cause of ac t ion , i t i s the 
duty of the court to grant a judgment based thereon." Ul ibarr i 
v. Christenson. 2 Utah 2d 367, 369, 275 P.2d 170, 171 (1954). 
Applying these p r inc ip les to the present case, tne only 
i s sues mater ial to the reso lu t ion of t h i s s u i t are those dealing 
with the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the sovereign immunity, the Disaster 
Response and Recovery Act, and the emergency police power 
defenses. If these defenses, as a matter of law, apply to t h i s 
s u i t , the other i ssues of fac t are immaterial. 
ti 
There are legal contentions concerning the appl icat ion 
of these defenses. There are not , however, any factual disputes 
tha t would have prevented the lower court from resolving t h i s 
case and enter ing summary judgment. Therefore, the lower court 
was correct in granting summary judgment, which action should be 
upheld. 
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I 
CONCLUSION 
For the above l i s t e d reasons, the State Respondents 
request that the lower c o u r t ' s rul ing be affirmed. 
DATED t h i s _ day of _ 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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